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British Library Event

Here's some advance notice of an event I am doing in December (it's not yet being publicized). Booking details to follow.

“The Big Read: London writers meet the Readers”

To celebrate the close of the National Year of Reading and the culmination of the Camden Big Read, the British Library is hosting an exciting evening with some of London’s most innovative and stimulating writers. Participants of this unique event will be able to engage with a diverse panel consisting of Sarfraz Manzoor, journalist and author of Greetings from Bury Park, Stephen Law, editor of THINK and author of The War for Children’s Minds, Esther Freud stage write and author of Love Falls, Ekow Eshun Art Director of the ICA and author of Black Gold of the Sun, Diran Adebayo broadcaster and acclaimed British novelist of My Once Upon a Time in addition to Adam Thirwell author of Miss Herbert and assistant editor of Areté.

Participants are encouraged to read at least one of the above titles before coming to the event in order to gain the most of this of the extraordinary occasion. The Camden Big Read runs from August – November.

The above titles will be available in Camden libraries and will also be discounted for purchase in the British Library Shop.

Although the event is free, advance booking is required.

December 16th
Conference Centre Auditorium
18:00-21:00

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